The paper provides a model that explains mixed land use patterns in urban areas. The paper contains a proof of the existence of competitive market equilibrium in a market for land in a small zone where more than one land use may be present. The model includes the possibility that external effects (both negative and positive) exist among the land uses. Brouwer's fixed point theorem is used for the proof. Conditions are derived in which mixed land use is an equilibrium pattern in a monocentric city.
Introduction
Fifty years ago William Alonso published the short version of his classic theory of location and land use [1] . That article presented the theory of bid rent curves, and concluded that the land use pattern of the monocentric city would consist of a set of von Thűnen concentric rings [1, p. 155] .
We now have, conceptually, families of bid rent curves for all three types of land uses. We also know that the steeper curves will occupy the more central locations. Therefore, if the curves of the various users are ranked by steepness, they will also be ranked in terms of their accessibility from the center of the city in the final solution. Thus, if the curves of the business firm are steeper than those of residences and the residential curves steeper than the agricultural, there will be businesses at the center of the city, surrounded by residences, and these will be surrounded by agriculture.
Alonso's theory remains at the core of models used to understand spatial patterns in urban areas. Fujita [2] provides a complete presentation of models in the Alonso tradition. The purpose of this paper is to present an extension of the Alonso model to provide an explanation for the fact that urban land uses are mixed and the landuse pattern does not conform to neat von Thűnen rings. This paper begins by considering market-determined land use allocation in a small zone in an urban area. The zone is not subject to zoning or other forms of control on land use allocation, and includes the possibility that land values in a particular use depend upon the amounts of land in the zone devoted to other uses. In other words, the model includes external effects of a particular form.
The final section in this paper adds location (distance to the central business district) to the model, which generates the possibility (for example) that land use is exclusive, then mixed, and then exclusive as distance to the CBD increases. This result provides an explanation for mixed land use that is complementary to the model developed by Wheaton [3] . The paper makes use of Brouwer's fixed point theorem, which is stated in a variety of equivalent forms. Varian [4, p. 320] states the theorem as follows:
If f:
is a continuous function from the unit simplex to itself, there is some x in 1 such that
Here S is a set of real numbers with dimensions with a range over the unit simplex. [5, p. 26] states the theorem as: "If S is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of R n , and if f is a continuous function from S to S, then f has a fixed point." Alternatively, Mendelson [6] provides a clearer statement of the theorem. Define the unit cube in n dimensional space, denoted I n , as the set of points   
Residential land in the zone boosts the value of the land devoted to commercial use just enough to establish equality between the two bid-rent levels. And this is a stable equilibrium because there is no further incentive to convert the use of land.
As distance to the CBD increases commercial bid-rent (holding q constant) continues to decline more rapidly than residential bid-rent, so the proportion of land devoted to residential use increases with distance and land use continues to be mixed. Eventually a distance u ** may be reached at which the bid-rent for residential use equals the bid-rent for commercial use even if the proportion of land in residential use is 1.0; i.e., 
Microeconomic Foundations
This paper is concerned with the market for land in a zone of finite size located in an urban area. The zone is occupied by households and/or firms, and the total amount of land occupied by these actors equals the total amount of land in the zone (L). In this section it is assumed that transportation costs are identical from all locations in the zone. Consider the zone in partial equilibrium.
Household utility is a function of a composite good (x), land (l), and possibly the percentages of land in the zone occupied by residential and other types of users of land (vector q). Households who choose to locate in the zone do so because the level of utility achieved is equal to the level (Ū) that can achieved elsewhere, so for household i,
The marginal effects of x and l on U are positive, and the marginal effects of externalities q can be of either sign. Households maximize utility subject to a budget constraint 
Bid-rent for the household is
Bid-rent is completely determined if the arguments in this function are given values.
The expenditure function for household i is   , , ,
so the (compensated) demand for land is   , , , .
If p x , and w are fixed, q in the zone is given, and Ū i is the required level of utility in the zone, then bid rent and the amount of land demanded by household i are determined.
Bid rent as a function of distance is found by totally differentiating the indirect utility function and solving for
for an increase in distance), with the result that, for d 0
Bid rent declines with distance because t and
are positive and
between bid rent a percentage of land occupied by other types of user nd also can be found by totally nd the s of la differentiating the indirect utility function, with the result that, for d 0
The sign of (6) .
The total amount of land in the households is zone occupied by
Now consider firms that may occupy sites in the zone. A simple characterization of firms is pr aid to workers. Output and profit are functions used here. Firms oduce output with constant returns to scale and fixed factor proportions and earn zero economic profit. Firms employ Ē workers and occupy ĺ f units of land. The amount of output that these inputs produce may vary depending upon the land use pattern in the zone in which the firm is located. The profit function for a firm is
where p is the price of output and w is the wage p of land uses in the zone for reasons that are discussed in the next section. The relationship between bid rent and land uses can be found by totally differentiating the profit function. Set-
The marginal effect of land rent on pr and the marginal effects of land uses on profits can be of ei
The model considers a zone in an urban area that potenfor one or more uses such as residential, nd ofits is negative, ther sign.
The Model
tially can be used commercial, industrial, and so on. It is assumed that the zone is small; the shadow value of land in the zone does not change as the size of the zone is increased marginally. The zone is small enough that its location vis-à-vis the rest of the urban area is considered to be identical for all points in the zone. The zone is of a size that external effects caused by mixed land uses in the zone can matter. The microeconomic models of consumer and firm in the previous section include the possibility that land use in the zone affects bid rent. The zone is not subject to zoning or other controls on land use. The zone may be several blocks, or it may be somewhat larger. Some empirical applications of the model are based on block data. The proportion of the zone that is in use i is q i , and the land value per unit of land in use i is   i v q , where q is the vector of the proportion of land uses in the zone, a   i q is a real-valued continuous function (that need not be differentiable). The elements of q a oportions of land used by households and firms, as discussed in the us section. The set of values for q sums to 1.0 and is convex. The land value functions can assume many specific forms. The signs of marginal effects are ambiguous. Consider commercial activities such as retail store, for example. The first store in the zone on a predominantly residential block enjoys advantages for which the owner is willing to pay a premium. Additional stores in the zone increase the competition and lower the store owner's bid for the land. Alternatively, there may be economies of agglomeration in store location-the shopping center effect. In this case the store owners may bid more for land in zones with other stores. The store owner's bid for land may also be affected by other land uses. Greater land devoted to residential use may increase the store owner's bid for land (access to customers), and they may bid less for land in zones with greater amounts of industrial use. It is also possible that the store owner's bid is unaffected by the land-use composition of the zone, in which case the marginal effects are zero and land value in commercial use is determined entirely by the location of the zone vis-à-vis the rest of the urban area. Owners of land used for residential purposes may bid more for land if the proportion in residential use increases, or they may value immediate access to commercial activities and employment. Owners of land for industrial purposes may value proximity to supporting commercial activities and workers, or there may be agglomeration economies in industrial land use that govern the bids for land.
The primary question that is solved in this paper is whether a market equilibrium set of land-use proportions (the q's) exists. The basic approach to the existen v re pr previo ce proof ca o land uses, such as residential n be seen in the case of two possible land uses. Indeed, the case of two land uses is quite pertinent for many applications of the model.
The Case of Two Land Uses
Consider the case of tw use and commercial use. There are two land-use proporvariable q varies from 0 to 1.0, so it is an ideal variable for an application of Bro wer's fixed point th  tions, q 1 and q 2 , which sum to 1.0. Because there are only two land uses, the model needs to determine only q 1 , which shall be denoted q. There are two land value functions;
Consider the following function that meets this requirement; 
Th ition e land e first cond states that, if th use number on oes no n the zone, the value of the land in the alternative lue in the alternative use by a positive amount x, then we have e d t exist i use must be equal to or greater than value in use one. This makes the numerator of the right-hand side of Equation (14) equal to zero.
The second condition states that, if both uses exist in the zone, then the land values for the two uses must be equal. This makes the right-hand side of Equation (14) reater than the value of the land in th that use is equal to or g e alternative use, which makes the right-hand side of Equation (14) equal to 1.0.
The existence of at least one market equilibrium q has been established. However, not all equilibria are stable. Stability requires that 
The Case of Three or More Land Uses
The case of three land u adds complexity to the analyses sis. Now there are three land uses such that 
and
min max 0, max 0, ; 1 min max 0, max 0,
nd (16) 
As in the case of two land uses, there are three cases to ium.
d similarly for q 2 . These conditions are needed to make the numerators of Equations (15) 
As noted in the case of two land uses, the stability condition is also needed if it so happens that s land value for two land uses are equal and one of those land uses does . There are now N land uses th 
The analogous three cases hold for each of the , ; 
Addition of Location to the Model
A use idential bid rents decline ate distances, and land is exclusively in residential use at greater distances. The model in this section is based on these ideas; residential bid rents decline with distance to the CBD because of commuting costs, and the productivity of a firm declines with distance to the CBD because of declining agglomeration effects. Workers who work near home earn wages that are lower than the wages of CBD workers by the amount of commuting costs saved. The urban area is a set of zones of finite size as discussed in Section 2 above, and transportation costs vary across zones (but are equal within a zone for a particular land use sector; e.g., households, firms of a particular type, and so on).
This section considers the case of two land uses in which land value depends upon distance to the CBD and tric city in which bid rents decline with distan central business district (CBD). A standard res ban economics, first stated by Alonso [1] and demonstrated rigorously by Fujita [2, p. 129] is that:
Assuming that the set of bid rent functions can be ordered according to their steepness, we obtain neat results: Both the equilibrium land use and optimal lan iquely, and they can be depicted by a set of Thünen rings surrounding the CBD.
This configuration is at variance with the facts; land use in real cities is mixed. As in the standard model, workers who work in the CB [3] W. Wheaton, , and Employment s a first case suppose th value access to the CBD and immediate access to customers; i.e., the effects of increases in q and u on land value are bo at users of residential land are indifferent to the mix of land use, and that the land value gradient is flatter for residential than for commercial use. In this case land near the CBD is allocated exclusively to commercial use, but beyond some distance u * (as defined above), mixed land use exists and is a stable equilibrium. Alternatively, suppose that commercial land use has agglomeration effects at the zone level; the effect of an increase in q on land value is positive for all values of q. The residential land value function remains as above. Now when distance u * is reached land use shifts abruptly from exclusive commercial use to exclusive residential use. Which case is more realistic? Empirical studies of land value functions can be used to answer this question.
McMillen and McDonald [8] is the most detailed study of urban land values in a city without zoning. The study examined estimated land values in Chicago in 1921, two years prior to the adoption of the city's first zoning ordinance. The study divided land use into residential and non-residential components. The e ude the following:  Non-residential land values declined with distance to the CBD more rapidly that did residential land values.  Non-residential land values increased with the proportion of residential land use on the block, but the effect of proportion residential did not have a statistically significant e These results are consistent with the pattern suggested above in which exclusive non-residential land use exists in and near the CBD, and an equilibrium with mixed land use exists at some distance from the CBD. A complementary study by McDonald and McMillen [9] found land-use patterns that conform to this pattern.
Conclusions
This paper has used Brouwer's fixed point theorem to demonstrate the existence of competitive market equilibrium for land in a "small" zone. The existence of equilibrium in this model previously had not been rigorously. The pro justment equations price adjustment equations that are used in proofs of the existence of competitive market equilibrium. Stability conditions also are shown. The stability condition essentially says that, at equilibrium, there is no incentive to convert land from its existing use to another use.
Distance to the CBD is added to the model in the final section of the paper, with the result that, under certain conditions, exclusive and mixed land use can exist in predictable patterns as distance to the CBD increases. However, under other conditions a pattern of exclusive land use is predicted; i.e., traditional Thünen rin rical evidence for land use in Chicago for 1921 (prior to the adoption of its first zoning ordinance) shows that mixed land use likely was the equilibrium pattern for a large city at that time. Both the empirical results for land value functions in McMillen and McDonald [8] and for actual land use patterns in McDonald and McMillen [9] for 1921 are consistent with this interpretation.
